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Abstract
The process of match formation in matching markets can be divided into
three parts: information sharing, investments in information acquisition, and
the formation of matches based on available information. The last stage where
agents are assumed to know their preferences has been studied in seminal work
of Gale and Shapley (1962), and a model of second stage costly information
acquisition is introduced and studied in Lee and Schwarz (2007). This paper
focuses on the first stage – information sharing – and examines mechanisms
which allow workers to signal their preferences over matching partners prior
to the assignment of interviews. The incentives of firms and workers vis-a-vis
information revelation are partially aligned – all other things being equal, a
worker prefers to have an interview with a firm that is high in his preference
ranking and a firm prefers to invest in interviewing a worker who ranks a firm
highly because such worker is more likely to accept a job if offered. However,
the incentives are far from being perfectly aligned. For instance, if firms pay the
full cost of interviewing, each worker would prefer to have as many interviews as
possible, and in a world with bilateral communication no information is revealed
as each workers would want to tell each firm that it is his first choice. But if
communication is moderated through an intermediary or there is a restriction on
the number of messages a worker can send, then cheap talk becomes informative.
Currently existing market institutions that facilitate information exchange prior
to interviewing are discussed.
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1 Introduction
The process of match formation in markets such as the marriage and labor markets
can be loosely divided into three parts: information sharing, investments in infor-
mation acquisition, and the formation of matches based on available information.
The last stage where agents are assumed to know their preferences has been stud-
ied in seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1962) and in flourishing literature that
followed (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a survey). A model of second stage
costly information acquisition, which we label the “interview assignment problem,”
is introduced and studied in Lee and Schwarz (2007). This paper focuses on the
first stage (information sharing). Information sharing includes the worker revealing
information about his ability and/or his preferences over potential employers. We
examines mechanisms which allow workers to signal their preferences over matching
partners prior to the assignment of interviews.
Considerable resources are devoted to information acquisition (e.g., interviewing
or dating) in matching markets. With regards to labor markets, a firm typically
can only interview a limited number of candidates due to the often significant costs
per interview; however, since these interviews affect the formation of preferences
and determine which partners are feasible matches, their allocation is as important
to efficiency as the design and execution of the matching process itself. Lee and
Schwarz (2007) tackles this interviewing assignment problem “in isolation” assuming
that agents ex-ante do not have private information about their preferences, and
demonstrate that even in a simple version of the interview problem it may be difficult
to characterize the equilibrium or solve for the efficient outcome. However, in many
instances, the preferences of workers and firms regarding whom to interview are
partially aligned. If there are two workers who are identical except for the fact that
one strongly prefers the firm and the other does not, the firm will prefer to interview
the worker who has the stronger preference. When interviews are costly, interviewing
a worker who has a strong preference for the firm indicates a greater likelihood that
the worker will accept a job offer if one is made; similarly, interviewing a worker
who does not like the firm is a bad investment since the worker would not be likely
to accept a job.
When interviewing costs are primarily borne by the firm – which can be signif-
icant once the time of employees are accounted for – the more important it is for
the firm to only interview those workers who are predisposed to accepting an offer.
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Nonetheless, without a credible means of signalling, workers have little incentive to
truthfully report their preferences and instead will exaggerate their affinity for cer-
tain firms: when the cost of unemployment are sufficiently high, workers will want
to maximize the number of interviews in order to have the greatest chance of being
employed. In turn, this inability to meaningfully communicate can lead to a great
deal of inefficiency and friction in the market. To illustrate, consider the allocation
of interviews in marriage markets – i.e., dates. A recent article profiled on Yahoo!’s
frontpage mentions “mistakes” that women often make in online dating markets,
including the following:
Mistake #7: Expecting Him to Tell the Truth in His Profile You don’t
like to be lied to. Nobody does. And once you’ve gone out with a man
who claimed to be 5’9” but is really 5’5”, it’s hard to keep dating. But
haven’t you ever done the same thing? The typical woman exaggerates
her height by one inch and lowers her weight by 20 pounds. And it’s
not just a coincidence that the most popular ages for women on dating
sites are 29, 39, 44 and 49. You want to be given a chance. You don’t
want to be judged before you meet. And you’re insecure that telling the
truth won’t get you in the door against younger, thinner women. So
if there are good reasons why an honest woman might be tempted to
misrepresent herself, wouldn’t it make sense that an honest man might
be tempted to do the same thing?1
This paper explores ways to allow for meaningful communication between parties
before interviews are assigned. In a stylized setting, we show that private bilateral
communication between workers and firms is uninformative and is ignored. However,
either utilizing an intermediary – which prevents workers from sending conflicting
messages – or a restriction on the number of messages a worker can send can be
sufficient to sustain an non-babbling equilibrium.
The communication between agents prior to the interviewing stage can be viewed
as a form of cheap talk. Workers may communicate to a firm information about
their ability and skills as well as information about their preferences. Note that to
maximize the probability of an interview, a worker may want to communicate to
each firm that he is a good match (a low quality firm would prefer to interview a
1http://dating.personals.yahoo.com/singles/gettingstarted/616/10-classic-online-dating-
mistakes, accessed on August 23, 2007.
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medium or low ability worker because high quality workers are unlikely to accept
offers). In a world where firms pay the cost of interviewing, workers want to get as
many interviews as possible. Thus, if communication is bilateral, a worker will have
an incentive to tell each firm that he is a perfect match both based on his ability and
preferences making informative communication impossible. But if communication
is public or has some public component, information transmission becomes possible.
The information transmission may be imperfect even with public communication for
reasons similar to the classic model of cheap talk (e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982)).2
However, this paper emphasizes a novel aspect of cheap talk that is essentially
unrelated to classic cheap talk models: unlike the classic model of cheap talk where
there is a single receiver of information, the present game has multiple receivers
with different preferences. The ability to send messages publicly via a centralized
authority or some central communication channel is critical for making information
transmission possible.3,4
These insights are indeed borne out in reality. In certain markets, an interme-
diary that can monitor or restrict the form of communication between workers and
firms does exist. Such is the case with on-campus recruiting at many professional
schools. For example, at Harvard Law School, a mechanism very similar to that
described in this section is employed for assigning summer associate interviews at
law firms to second-year law students: each student is allowed to submit a prefer-
ence rank-ordered list of up to 35 firms; firms then assign interviews giving priority
to those students who rank those firms the highest. Importantly, employers are
prohibited from pre-screening candidates – they cannot view student records, re-
sumes or transcripts – and consequently applicants truly are ex ante homogenous.
2For instance, if a man would like to date women who are a few years younger than them and if
women prefer to date men their same age, perfect information revelation is not possible; however, it
is possible to reveal some information about age because interests are partially aligned – although
a man might view an ideal date to be a few years younger than him, he would not want a date
someone much younger because it is very unlikely to lead to a match (again, given that women
prefer men close to their age).
3Politicians face a similar problem. To be elected a politician may want to tell each constituency
what it wants to hear. If all messages are broadcasted to all constituencies, communication may
become more truthful if a politician values getting the support of like minded people more than
the support of other voters.
4In a model that focuses on unravelling in matching markets, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2006)
allow for an interpretation of a transcript as a cheap talk about student’s ability. That paper shows
that if transcripts of all (or a random sample of students) are publicly observable than schools
can credibly reveal to employers some information about student ability even when schools cannot
commit to honest grading in a one period game.
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On the other hand, some business schools (such as Michigan and UCLA) provide
students with a limited budget to bid on interview spots that certain companies
have left open.5 And in the job market for junior economists, candidates are al-
lowed to send up to two signals to potential departments expressing their interest
in being interviewed.6 In the latter two cases, providing applicants with a fixed and
limited budget effectively accomplishes the same goal as monitoring and limiting
the number of (conflicting) signals that can be sent.
2 Signalling Preferences
For discussion, we adopt a stylized model of communication, interviewing, and
matching. We assume there are an equal number N of firms and workers (where
the set of firms is given by F and the set of workers by W ), each firm hires at most
one worker, and market participants will eventually be matched via a matching pro-
cess which we assume to be a firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale
and Shapley (1962)). Before engaging in this process, firms must discover their
preferences over workers by interviewing them; they do so by simultaneously assign-
ing interviews (and conducting them) to a subset of workers, and each firm bears a
strictly positive cost c per interview. On the other hand, workers already know their
preferences before interviewing, and they are uncorrelated and distributed uniformly
over firms.
As shown in Lee and Schwarz (2007), for any number of interviews x, there exists
a cost c such that in equilibrium, each firm will interview exactly x workers and
each worker will obtain exactly x interviews. In this equilibrium, firms will discover
their ranking of workers during their interviews, and participants will report their
true preferences over partners during the matching process. Since workers cannot
influence interview assignment in this model, their preferences in this stage are
ignored.
Nonetheless, it may be socially desirable for firms to know and utilize worker
preferences when assigning interviews. For example, if firms ignored worker prefer-
ences, often there may be two workers who would wish to swap interviews if each
5See also So¨nmez and U¨nver (2004). They show that although using a single instrument (bids)
to communicate both preferences and claims can have efficiency costs in the case of course bidding,
under certain assumptions these problems do not extend to interview-bidding since agents there do
not have binding quotas.
6http://www.aeaweb.org/joe/signal/
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preferred the other’s firm without adversely affecting the utility of any firm; in fact,
if given the choice, firms would wish for such trades to happen since each firm
(weakly) prefers interviewing the worker who prefers that firm more strongly than
the other. Doing so would increase the probability that an offer, if made, would be
accepted, and increase the returns from interviewing a particular worker.
We now consider the possibility of allowing for a communication stage between
workers and firms prior to the interview stage. We first show that private, bilateral
communication between each firm and worker cannot yield any improvement for the
workers: all communication is either ignored or uninformative in any equilibrium.
We then construct a mechanism whereby workers “publicly” communicate their
complete preferences to an intermediary, and this intermediary recommends to each
firm a subset of workers to interview. Such a mechanism has an equilibrium whereby
workers report their true preferences, and firms obey its recommendations. Finally,
in cases where such public communication is infeasible or the communication of
complete rank order lists infeasible, we show that merely being able to monitor the
number of interviews each worker has during the interview assignment stage can
substantially improve upon the no-communication outcome.
For the purposes of this discussion, we abstract away from the coordination
issues introduced in Lee and Schwarz (2007), and assume the following:
Assumption 2.1. Fix c such that there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
interview assignment ηˆ in which each firm and each worker conducts x interviews.
An interview assignment η is simply a correspondence from the set of workers and
firms F ∪W into itself such that f ∈ η(w) (which means w interviews with f) if
and only if w ∈ η(f), where f and w are elements of F and W , respectively.
2.1 Bilateral Communication
We first address the case where prior to the interview selection stage, each worker
simultaneously is able to privately send a message mwf to each firm indicating
how much that worker prefers that firm. Though the message space M can be
defined generally, one natural candidate would be M ≡ {1, ..., N}, where mwf can
be understood to be the rank that firm f is on w’s preference list.
Our first result shows that if workers communicate privately with each firm,
then it turns out that such communication is “cheap” and cannot achieve a better
outcome for workers than in the case without worker communication.
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Proposition 2.1. If communication between workers and firms is private and non-
verifiable, then communication is uninformative or ignored in equilibrium.
This result should not be too surprising – with private bilateral communication,
there is nothing to prevent workers from sending conflicting messages to each firm,
and thus every worker will tell each firm what it needs to say in order to maximize
his chance of obtaining an interview. Indeed, we often observe in practice that
applicants often send cover letters to firms stating each firm is their “top choice”; in
turn, firms have learned to discount such cheap talk accordingly to the extent that
such signals are ignored.
2.2 “Public” Communication
One natural solution to the bilateral communication problem would be to restrict
workers from sending multiple (and possibly conflicting) messages by allowing them
only to communicate once with a central intermediary. By requiring workers to
communicate only once with one party, they cannot simultaneously inform different
firms that it is their top choice. Consider the following interview-assignment mech-
anism which requires each worker to submit a rank-ordered list of their preferences
P˜w over firms, and then subsequently provides each firm privately with a subset of
workers to interview η(P˜W ) where η(·) is generated as follows:7
- In the first round, each firm is assigned all workers who have ranked that firm
their first choice for an interview according to P˜w. If more than x workers rank
a particular firm as their top choice, then x workers are chosen at random from
those that do.
- In general, in round t, any firm who has not yet received x interviews accepts
all workers who also have not received x interviews and ranks that firm as
their t-th highest choice. In the case that accepting all worker who rank that
firm their t-th choice results in a firm interviewing more than x candidates,
the firm chooses at random enough workers such that the firm ends up with
exactly x total candidates.
This procedure terminates with an interview assignment that allocates each worker
and each firm exactly x interviews. This mechanism can be seen as a worker-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm for interviews, where firms are indifferent
7P˜W ≡ {P˜w}∀w∈W is simply the set of preferences for all workers.
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among all workers (thus will accept any interview offer up to quota), and each worker
and firm has a quota of x.
Proposition 2.2. There exists an equilibrium whereby workers report preferences
truthfully (P˜w = Pw ∀ w), and firms allocate interviews according to the assignment
proposed by the intermediary, η(P˜w).
By construction, this outcome is Pareto optimal for workers among all outcomes
that assign each worker and firm x interviews – no two workers could swap firm
interviews and each be better off. Furthermore, no firm would not wish to switch a
worker w with a worker w′ from any other firm: a firm does not know how highly it
ranked on w’s or w′’s preferences, nor does it know the identities of the other firms
interviewing the workers; all it knows is that w will receive exactly x interviews in
the equilibrium described, and if it did swap, it would receive an interview with a
worker w′ who prefers that firm less than any of its current interviewers.8 Thus, the
resultant allocation is pairwise stable.9
We refer to this particular mechanism as “public” communication because work-
ers must commit to making only one announcement of their rank-ordered preference
list and cannot provide conflicting messages to different parties. This is even despite
the fact that firms at no point are privy to the announcements, an assumption we
make only for technical reasons.10 Note also that an intermediary in this setting
functions also as a coordination device, enabling firms to evenly distribute interviews
by giving each worker exactly x.
2.3 Monitoring the Number of Interviews
In many cases however, public communication or a centralized intermediary may
be infeasible – the former may be unobservable or unverifiable, and the latter may
be too costly to implement. Furthermore, requiring workers to submit complete
preference listings may be both burdensome for them to compute or too complex to
8If w ranked firm f as its kth ranked firm, any w′ who did not get an interview with f must have
ranked f as its kth or lower choice (otherwise, w′ would have been assigned f as an interview in
addition to or in place of w). Since f does not know the identities of the other firms that interview
w or w′, a firm would weakly prefer interviewing the worker who preferred the firm higher.
9A pairwise stable match is a matching in which there is no firm and worker pair who are not
matched that would prefer to be matched to each other than to their existing partners.
10This condition is to avoid “overlap” concerns and ensure the existence of a symmetric pure
strategy interview assignment among firms, as we have assumed. If firms could observe the an-
nouncements, then the equilibrium assignment η(PW ) may no longer be an equilibrium for firms
to follow due to asymmetric overlap conditions for certain announcements of PW .
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communicate when N is large.11 In this setting, is it still possible to improve upon
the no-communication outcome? As long as firms are able to observe the number
of interviews any worker obtains during the interview assignment stage – even with
private bilateral communication – the answer is affirmative.
Assume each worker w can initially send a signal to any firm f ; i.e.,mwf ∈ {0, 1},
where mwf = 0 indicates that w did not send f a signal. Next, during the interview
assignment stage, nature selects a random ordering of firms; firms then take turns
selecting a worker to interview, only observing the number of interviews each worker
has received up to that point and not the identities of the firms interviewing him.
Importantly, we assume that only after every firm has stopped assigning interviews
do interviews actually occur.
Proposition 2.3. For some N and (k1, . . . , kN ) ∈ {1, . . . , N}N , there exists an
equilibrium in which each worker wi sends a message to a firm f if and only if f
is one of his kith highest ranked forms, and a firm assigns an interview to a worker
only if he has signalled to it.
This mechanism only requires that firms be able to observe the number of inter-
views a worker receives during the interview assignment stage; it places no restric-
tions on the number of messages a worker receives. Instead, the decision to moderate
the number of signals sent is borne by the worker, induced by the following tradeoff
from sending an additional signal: an extra signal decreases the probability that a
worker will receive less than x interviews; on the other hand, an extra signal in-
creases the probability that a less desirable firm will interview the worker in place
of a more desirable firm.
The proposition follows immediately by noting that it holds for ki = N ∀ i and
that for any fixed ki, if worker wi signals to a firm f ′, it will signal to all firms f Â f ′
– otherwise he could do better by signalling to the higher ranked firm instead of
f ′. In general, we cannot say anything specific about the number of signals sent in
equilibrium unless we translate worker preferences over firms into cardinal utilities.
Nonetheless, in terms of comparative statics, it follows that if workers are almost
indifferent between their top and lowest firm, then they will choose to signal more
than if the differences between firms were greater.12
11See Segal (2005) for a discussion on the costs of full preference revelation in two-sided matching
markets.
12Coles and Niederle (2006) explore the use of limited signals in matching markets, whereby
participants can preferences prior to a match. In this setting, preferences are known ex ante, and
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Though the message space could be larger without substantially changing the
outcome, any informative message (i.e., one that a firm receives and uses to in-
fluence its behavior) must be interpreted the same way in order for there to be
any notion of truthful revelation – if firms differentially treated the receipt of two
different messages, then workers would have incentive only to report the message
that maximized its chances of obtaining an interview. Thus, the simple commu-
nication protocol used here not only is sufficient, but minimizes the complexity of
communication and possible scope for strategic misrepresentation.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Clearly, there exists an equilibrium where every firm ig-
nores any communication that occurs and plays, and workers send meaningless mes-
sages.
We now show that there any equilibrium where communication is utilized is un-
informative. Assume that there exists an equilibrium where a firm f “listens” to a
signal received by a worker w in that a higher message mwf corresponds to a higher
probability that worker w receives an interview. Since a worker cannot be worse off
by receiving more interviews (holding the firms with which he does interview fixed)
and can in fact be better off (being more likely to be hired by a more preferred
firm), all workers will have an incentive to tell each firm that the firm is their high-
est choice. In turn, if there is a signal that provides a higher probability a worker is
interviewed then another signal, then every worker will have an incentive to provide
the signal that provides the highest probability of being hired to each firm. The
same “message” thus will be sent to every firm by every worker. To fully describe
the resultant equilibrium, we let firms randomly select y candidates from all workers
who provided the highest signal (e.g., the firm is their top choice), and all work-
ers tell every firm this message. This resultant equilibrium is outcome equivalent
to a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium without communication whereby firms
randomly selected y workers to interview.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Assume workers report truthfully. Then given the mecha-
nism assigns each firm exactly x interviews with workers who also have x interviews,
thus the interview stage of information acquisition is ignored. However, they are able to obtain
some comparative statics indicating that welfare may improve with the introduction of a signalling
mechanism.
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by assumption 2.1, there exists a Nash equilibrium for the interview assignment stage
whereby firms will interview according to η(PW ).
Given firms interview according to η(PW ) and all other workers report truthfully,
we now show that any individual worker will not wish to deviate. First, a worker
cannot truncate his preferences or omit to include any firm because the mechanism
requires a full rank ordering; even if submitting an incomplete list of preferences
were to be allowed, a worker still would not wish to do so since truncation would
create a positive probability of obtaining less than x interviews but yield no benefit.
Second, if a worker prefers firm i to j, he will not report that j is ranked higher
than i: since all other workers have preferences symmetrically distributed across
firms, and since each firm gives priority for interviews to workers who apply in
earlier rounds, the probability of obtaining an interview for a given firm is strictly
increasing in the rank it was submitted; thus, a worker would do strictly better by
reporting i as higher ranked than j, since he values an interview with firm i more
than one with firm j.
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